Medical decision making : an international journal of the Society for Medical Decision Making · 2006
The cost-effectiveness of strategies to reduce mortality from an intentional release of aerosolized anthrax spores.
Сравнительное исследованиеСтатьяПоддержка NIH: внешняя программаНазвание и аннотация: Перевод в очереди
Обработка статьи · этапы, ошибки и управление
Загрузка состояния…
Ошибки и ограничения
История · было → стало
Состояние обновляется каждые 5 секунд, пока блок открыт. Процент показывается только там, где известен объём работы. Пауза останавливает продолжение этапа; текущий запрос к источнику может завершиться.
Braithwaite R Scott, Fridsma Douglas, Roberts Mark S
Аннотация
BACKGROUND: Intentional exposures to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores have caused fatalities.
OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of strategies to reduce mortality from future inhalational anthrax exposures.
METHODS: Computer cohort simulation of a 100,000-person single-site exposure (worst-case scenario) and a 100-person multiple-site exposure (resembling the recent US attack). For each scenario, universal vaccination and an emergency surveillance and response (ESR) system were compared with a default strategy that assumed eventual discovery of the exposure.
RESULTS: If an exposure was unlikely to occur or was small in scale, neither vaccination nor an ESR system was cost-effective. If an exposure was certain and large in scale, an ESR system was more cost-effective than vaccination ($73 v. $29,600 per life-year saved), and a rapid response saved more lives than improved surveillance.
CONCLUSIONS: Strategies to reduce deaths from anthrax attacks are cost-effective only if large exposures are certain. A faster response is more beneficial than enhanced surveillance.
OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of strategies to reduce mortality from future inhalational anthrax exposures.
METHODS: Computer cohort simulation of a 100,000-person single-site exposure (worst-case scenario) and a 100-person multiple-site exposure (resembling the recent US attack). For each scenario, universal vaccination and an emergency surveillance and response (ESR) system were compared with a default strategy that assumed eventual discovery of the exposure.
RESULTS: If an exposure was unlikely to occur or was small in scale, neither vaccination nor an ESR system was cost-effective. If an exposure was certain and large in scale, an ESR system was more cost-effective than vaccination ($73 v. $29,600 per life-year saved), and a rapid response saved more lives than improved surveillance.
CONCLUSIONS: Strategies to reduce deaths from anthrax attacks are cost-effective only if large exposures are certain. A faster response is more beneficial than enhanced surveillance.