Frontiers in public health · 2026
Digital inclusion, legal governance, and the adoption of smart care services by older adults in China: an evolutionary game analysis.
СтатьяНазвание и аннотация: Перевод в очереди
Обработка статьи · этапы, ошибки и управление
Загрузка состояния…
Ошибки и ограничения
История · было → стало
Состояние обновляется каждые 5 секунд, пока блок открыт. Процент показывается только там, где известен объём работы. Пауза останавливает продолжение этапа; текущий запрос к источнику может завершиться.
Hu Yu, Xiao Yuqi, Gao Xuan, Huang Zhengzong
Аннотация
INTRODUCTION: The availability of digital care services does not ensure their adoption by older adults.
METHODS: This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game involving government, platform enterprises, and older adults to examine how legal governance, enterprise investment, and user-side benefits jointly shape the adoption of smart care services by older adults in China. The payoff structure applies penalties and reputational losses only to passive enterprise investment and makes age-friendly design, data protection, and support measures improve the relative payoff of adoption. Official procurement records, enterprise disclosures, administrative performance data, subsidy standards, and survey estimates provide direct observable anchors, proxy-informed ranges, or scenario bounds according to parameter identifiability.
RESULTS: Under a coordinated baseline and an initial utilization share of 0.116, the system reached (0.908, 0.919, 0.965) at t = 80. A low government-and-enterprise initial state recovered much more slowly but approached the same high-inclusion equilibrium by t = 300. Across 2,000 seeded draws, the share with all three strategies above 0.9 increased from 1.95% at t = 80 to 6.1% at t = 1,000; the high-inclusion corner was locally stable in 6.2% of the drawn parameter sets.
DISCUSSION: These are conditional simulation results, not population probabilities. High inclusion requires the public value of intervention to exceed implementation cost, sanctions and reputation to offset the short-run advantage of underinvestment, and user benefits and support to overcome the outside option.
METHODS: This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game involving government, platform enterprises, and older adults to examine how legal governance, enterprise investment, and user-side benefits jointly shape the adoption of smart care services by older adults in China. The payoff structure applies penalties and reputational losses only to passive enterprise investment and makes age-friendly design, data protection, and support measures improve the relative payoff of adoption. Official procurement records, enterprise disclosures, administrative performance data, subsidy standards, and survey estimates provide direct observable anchors, proxy-informed ranges, or scenario bounds according to parameter identifiability.
RESULTS: Under a coordinated baseline and an initial utilization share of 0.116, the system reached (0.908, 0.919, 0.965) at t = 80. A low government-and-enterprise initial state recovered much more slowly but approached the same high-inclusion equilibrium by t = 300. Across 2,000 seeded draws, the share with all three strategies above 0.9 increased from 1.95% at t = 80 to 6.1% at t = 1,000; the high-inclusion corner was locally stable in 6.2% of the drawn parameter sets.
DISCUSSION: These are conditional simulation results, not population probabilities. High inclusion requires the public value of intervention to exceed implementation cost, sanctions and reputation to offset the short-run advantage of underinvestment, and user benefits and support to overcome the outside option.