Beyond the ban: Explaining how Turkey reduced diversion and illicit poppy cultivation after 1974.

A central tenet of the drug control literature is that the prohibition of drug crops (opium poppy, coca, cannabis) generates a "prohibition premium" that strengthens illicit supply chains and provides a lucrative alternative to legal agriculture. This paper complicates this view by examining a puzzling counter-case: Turkey's transition to a fully licit opiates fully licit supply chain. Analyzing the post-1974 control regime, I argue that two interventions were critical: the switch to poppy straw process, and the Grain Board's (TMO) price stabilization policies. While the former removed opium from the supply chain and thus minimized opportunities for diversion at the farm level, latter provided stability for smallholders amidst the fluctuations generated by liberalization of the economy. The case thus demonstrates that states can successfully manage a licit opiate supply chain with minimal diversions and illicit cultivation by removing opportunities and stabilizing agrarian livelihoods through public interventions.