Future-like-ours as a metaphysical reductio ad absurdum argument of personal identity.

Don Marquis' future-like-ours account is regarded as the best secular anti-abortion position because he frames abortion as a wrongful killing via deprivation of a valuable future. Marquis objects to the reductio ad absurdum of contraception as being immoral because it is too difficult to identify an individual that is deprived of a future. To demonstrate why Marquis' treatment of the contraception reductio is flawed by his own future-like-ours line of reasoning, I offer an argument for why there is indeed a candidate for harm-the ovum-for it can be viewed as providing the functional foundation for a new life through (1) mitochondrial DNA inheritance, (2) paternal histone restructuring during fertilization, and (3) ability to initiate parthenogenesis. As evidenced by these distinct and natural features of ova, candidate (2) "some ovum or other" should be morally prioritized as the direct candidate for harm in the contraception reductio. By assessing the philosophical inconsistencies in Marquis' future-like-ours argument, this paper provides strong metaphysical grounds for rejecting the best secular anti-abortion position.