On the matter of essence.

A large literature suggests that people attribute the inborn properties of living things to their essence. Here, I explore the possibility that the essence of living things must be further embodied, and that this presumption guides intuitive reasoning about all of an organism's inherited properties, physical and psychological. Accordingly, when people reason about agentive living things (animals and humans), they presume that (a) Their essence must exhibit the properties of bodily matter- it must occupy a certain location in space, and it must be comprised of some appropriate organic substance that is anchored in the body; (b) Inborn (essentialized) traits must be embodied, and conversely, embodied traits are likely innate; and (c) The identity of biological kinds and by extension, one's psychological core, are defined by the material properties of their essence. I show that the embodiment hypothesis can capture numerous phenomena, ranging from laypeople's intuitions about which psychological traits are plausibly innate to their perception of the self and its capacity to migrate to humanoids and reemerge after death.