Drug and alcohol review · 2020
Association between state-level alcohol availability and taxation policies on the prevalence of alcohol-related harms to persons other than the drinker in the USA, 2000-2015.
СтатьяПоддержка NIH: внешняя программаПоддержка исследования: вне правительства СШАНазвание и аннотация: Перевод в очереди
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Trangenstein Pamela J, Subbaraman Meenakshi S, Greenfield Thomas K, Mulia Nina, Kerr William C, Karriker-Jaffe Katherine J
Аннотация
INTRODUCTION AND AIMS: Alcohol-related harms to others (AHTO) are consequences of alcohol use borne by persons other than the drinker. This study assessed whether the odds of experiencing AHTO are associated with alcohol availability and taxation policies.
DESIGN AND METHODS: This study pooled data from four waves of the National Alcohol Survey (n = 20656 adults). We measured past-year AHTO exposure using three binary variables: physical (pushed/hit/assaulted or property damage by someone who had been drinking), family or financial (family/marital problems or financial harms by someone who had been drinking) and driving AHTO (riding in a vehicle with a drink-driver or being in a drink-driving crash). Policies included bar and off-premise alcohol outlet density (separately), alcohol retail hours, beer and spirits taxes (separately) and monopoly on retail/wholesale alcohol purchases.
RESULTS: Monopolies were associated with 41.2% lower odds of physical harms [adjusted odds ratio (aOR) = 0.59, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.45, 0.77, q < 0.001 correcting for multiple analyses], and a 10% increase in bar density was associated with a 1.2% increase in odds of driving-related harms ( e ln(1.1) * β =1.01, 95% CI 1.00, 1.02, q = 0.03). Among men, beer taxes were associated with lower odds of physical harms ( eln(1.1) * β =0.93, 95% CI 0.88, 0.98 q = 0.03) and monopolies were associated with lower odds of physical (aOR = 0.45, 95% CI 0.35, 0.59, q < 0.001) and driving harms (aOR = 0.66, 95% CI 1.00, 1.02, q = 0.03).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Monopolies, taxes and outlet density are associated with odds of some AHTO. Future longitudinal research should test whether physical availability and taxation policies may be protective for bystanders as well as drinkers.
DESIGN AND METHODS: This study pooled data from four waves of the National Alcohol Survey (n = 20656 adults). We measured past-year AHTO exposure using three binary variables: physical (pushed/hit/assaulted or property damage by someone who had been drinking), family or financial (family/marital problems or financial harms by someone who had been drinking) and driving AHTO (riding in a vehicle with a drink-driver or being in a drink-driving crash). Policies included bar and off-premise alcohol outlet density (separately), alcohol retail hours, beer and spirits taxes (separately) and monopoly on retail/wholesale alcohol purchases.
RESULTS: Monopolies were associated with 41.2% lower odds of physical harms [adjusted odds ratio (aOR) = 0.59, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.45, 0.77, q < 0.001 correcting for multiple analyses], and a 10% increase in bar density was associated with a 1.2% increase in odds of driving-related harms ( e ln(1.1) * β =1.01, 95% CI 1.00, 1.02, q = 0.03). Among men, beer taxes were associated with lower odds of physical harms ( eln(1.1) * β =0.93, 95% CI 0.88, 0.98 q = 0.03) and monopolies were associated with lower odds of physical (aOR = 0.45, 95% CI 0.35, 0.59, q < 0.001) and driving harms (aOR = 0.66, 95% CI 1.00, 1.02, q = 0.03).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Monopolies, taxes and outlet density are associated with odds of some AHTO. Future longitudinal research should test whether physical availability and taxation policies may be protective for bystanders as well as drinkers.