The Journal of infection · 2004
The public health response to a case of Lassa fever in London in 2000.
СтатьяНазвание и аннотация: Перевод в очереди
Обработка статьи · этапы, ошибки и управление
Загрузка состояния…
Ошибки и ограничения
История · было → стало
Состояние обновляется каждые 5 секунд, пока блок открыт. Процент показывается только там, где известен объём работы. Пауза останавливает продолжение этапа; текущий запрос к источнику может завершиться.
Crowcroft N S, Meltzer M, Evans M, Shetty N, Maguire H, Bahl M, Gair R, Brink N, Lockwood D, Gregor S, Jones J, Nicoll A, Gopal R, Brown D, Bannister B
Аннотация
OBJECTIVES: Evaluation of the Department of Health 1996 guidance, the Memorandum on the Management and Control of Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers.
METHODS: Description of the public health management in 2000 of the fifth UK patient confirmed to have Lassa fever.
RESULTS: Delayed risk categorisation of the patient occurred for a variety of reasons. DH Guidance was followed once infection control advice was sought. Active surveillance of 125 contacts was extremely resource intense, involving over 3000 communications. Self-monitoring by healthcare workers should be considered in future. Advice on use of ribavirin prophylaxis is not included in the Memorandum, nor advice or templates for information sheets for contacts. Information sheets are now available from the Health Protection Agency in the event of future cases. International aspects not adequately addressed include the need for reliable risk assessment to be carried out before patients are medically evacuated from the country of origin, and the steps required to repatriate UK nationals. Effective and efficient communication is required between national and international organisations involved in such incidents.
CONCLUSIONS: If guidelines are unclear or impracticable they will not be followed. It is important that lessons are learned and documented and that national guidance be regularly reviewed.
METHODS: Description of the public health management in 2000 of the fifth UK patient confirmed to have Lassa fever.
RESULTS: Delayed risk categorisation of the patient occurred for a variety of reasons. DH Guidance was followed once infection control advice was sought. Active surveillance of 125 contacts was extremely resource intense, involving over 3000 communications. Self-monitoring by healthcare workers should be considered in future. Advice on use of ribavirin prophylaxis is not included in the Memorandum, nor advice or templates for information sheets for contacts. Information sheets are now available from the Health Protection Agency in the event of future cases. International aspects not adequately addressed include the need for reliable risk assessment to be carried out before patients are medically evacuated from the country of origin, and the steps required to repatriate UK nationals. Effective and efficient communication is required between national and international organisations involved in such incidents.
CONCLUSIONS: If guidelines are unclear or impracticable they will not be followed. It is important that lessons are learned and documented and that national guidance be regularly reviewed.