Toward a necessary right to self-representation in European civil law.

This article argues that the highly restrictive approach to self-representation in civil proceedings within European civil law systems lacks sufficient historical, dogmatic, and functional justification, being increasingly incompatible with contemporary standards on access to justice. A historical-comparative reconstruction of the Romano-canonical model and the evolution of legal professions shows that there was no original veto on litigants choosing to conduct their own case. In other words, current mandatory-representation rules largely stem from guild-like dynamics of monopolizing audience rights. A contrast with common law systems-where "pure" forms of self-representation coexist with mechanisms such as the McKenzie friend (UK) and Standby/Advisory Counsel (US) -highlights the particular rigidity of the continental model. Paradoxically, civil law systems are characterized by strong judicial management, codified frameworks and the principle of iura novit curia, which make it easier to correct lay errors without excluding self-represented parties from the forum. On this basis, the article advances a twofold normative thesis: (i) in light of Article 6 ECHR and contemporary access-to-justice standards, a limited but effective right to self-representation in less complex civil disputes is possible; and (ii) this right should be structured through assisted self-representation schemes, particularly via an adapted reception of the Standby Counsel model, capable of balancing party autonomy, equality of arms, and procedural efficiency. The proposal requires rethinking the role of intermediate legal professions, subjecting corporate monopolies to scrutiny. Also, recognizing that the democratic legitimacy of civil justice demands meaningful space for the citizen's direct voice before the courts.