Quality competition in local hospital markets: some econometric evidence from the period 1982-1988.

This study examines whether American hospitals continued to engage in non-price or quality competition over the recent past as health care markets underwent fundamental structural changes and the economic incentives facing hospital managers were correspondingly altered. It also investigates the degree to which such rivalrous behavior contributes to losses in economic welfare. An econometric model of quality competition is specified that tests, among other things, for the effect of spending by the hospital to enhance the quality of output on annual changes in its share of the local (inpatient) market as well as the effects of competitive conditions in the local market on the annual sum spent on quality enhancement. The model is estimated with panel data on 195 acute care hospitals in the State of Florida for the years 1982-1988. The results suggest that quality competitive behavior continued unabated over this period and that it was stimulated as much by the growth in physician supply and alternative delivery mechanisms as it was by other competing hospitals in the local market. Furthermore, the results show that quality competition yields some inefficiency or waste, but much of it also meets the test of the market.