F1000Research · 2026
Counterbalance Economics (CBE): Harnessing Aggregate Markups to Finance Voucher-Based Inequality Reduction.
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Malliaros Peter, Pacheco-Jaramillo W Alejandro
Аннотация
BACKGROUND: Corporate markups have risen markedly since the 1980s, widening the gap between profits and wages and fuelling income inequality. Counterbalance Economics (CBE) proposes a market-mediated voucher mechanism that recycles part of markup rents into firm-redeemable purchasing power for low-income households.
METHODOLOGY: We assemble an unbalanced panel of 12 countries (1982-2016) combining World Bank/LIS Gini indices, aggregate markups, macro controls, and within-sample policy analogues. Because four later policy cases occur after 2016, empirical identification rests only on China, Malaysia and Australia; Germany, France, Sweden and Brazil are discussed as post-sample policy analogues rather than sources of estimation variation.
RESULTS: Markups are positively associated with inequality, while the markup-policy interaction is negative in the preferred specification. These estimates should be interpreted as exploratory evidence on rent-capture and in-kind redistribution analogues.
CONCLUSIONS: CBE remains a potentially scalable complement to progressive taxation and universal public services, but its viability depends on institutional capacity, treatment coverage, inflation management, regulatory enforcement, and compatibility with existing tax-transfer systems. Future research should use microdata, sector-level markups, pilot implementation and fully reproducible code to test the mechanism directly.
METHODOLOGY: We assemble an unbalanced panel of 12 countries (1982-2016) combining World Bank/LIS Gini indices, aggregate markups, macro controls, and within-sample policy analogues. Because four later policy cases occur after 2016, empirical identification rests only on China, Malaysia and Australia; Germany, France, Sweden and Brazil are discussed as post-sample policy analogues rather than sources of estimation variation.
RESULTS: Markups are positively associated with inequality, while the markup-policy interaction is negative in the preferred specification. These estimates should be interpreted as exploratory evidence on rent-capture and in-kind redistribution analogues.
CONCLUSIONS: CBE remains a potentially scalable complement to progressive taxation and universal public services, but its viability depends on institutional capacity, treatment coverage, inflation management, regulatory enforcement, and compatibility with existing tax-transfer systems. Future research should use microdata, sector-level markups, pilot implementation and fully reproducible code to test the mechanism directly.