Psychology of addictive behaviors : journal of the Society of Psychologists in Addictive Behaviors · 2024
Illusion of control or passive superstition? A comparison of two explanations for irrational gambling beliefs.
СтатьяСравнительное исследованиеНазвание и аннотация: Перевод пока не подготовлен
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Monson Alex, James Richard J E, Wootton Robyn E, Newall Philip
Аннотация
OBJECTIVE: The "illusion of control" is a dominant cognitive illusion in disordered gambling, but its role in shaping irrational gambling beliefs has been questioned by recent null experimental findings. Here, we aimed to test this recent work, in a preregistered Bayesian framework, by additionally correlating the dependent variable (nonuniform probabilistic beliefs) with self-reported gambling behavior and by exploring "passive superstition" as an alternative driver of these irrational gambling beliefs.
METHOD: A between-participants online experiment involving three boxes, one of which a $1 prize was randomly assigned to (N = 3,064; 49.1% males, 49.5% females, 1.4% other; Mage = 42.5 years). Participants estimated the likelihood of each box winning, with any estimates outside the 33%-34% interval categorized as irrational "nonuniform" probabilistic beliefs. "Preselection" participants gave estimates prior to box selection, "post-no-choice" participants had their box randomly selected, and participants in the treatment "postchoice" condition selected their own box. Whether participants gambled within the past 12 months (gambling status), Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) score, and passive superstition scores were used as additional predictors.
RESULTS: Comparing postchoice participants with post-no-choice participants (95% CI [0.80, 1.22]) and comparing postchoice with preselection participants (95% CI [0.88, 1.34]) yielded substantial support for a null effect. Gambling status supported substantial evidence for a null effect (95% CI [0.92, 1.30]), whereas higher PGSI (95% CI [1.08, 1.13]) and higher passive superstition scores (95% CI [1.08, 1.10]) overwhelmingly predicted our outcome.
CONCLUSIONS: Active choice elements in illusions of control may have been overemphasized in irrational gambling beliefs compared to passive superstitions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
METHOD: A between-participants online experiment involving three boxes, one of which a $1 prize was randomly assigned to (N = 3,064; 49.1% males, 49.5% females, 1.4% other; Mage = 42.5 years). Participants estimated the likelihood of each box winning, with any estimates outside the 33%-34% interval categorized as irrational "nonuniform" probabilistic beliefs. "Preselection" participants gave estimates prior to box selection, "post-no-choice" participants had their box randomly selected, and participants in the treatment "postchoice" condition selected their own box. Whether participants gambled within the past 12 months (gambling status), Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) score, and passive superstition scores were used as additional predictors.
RESULTS: Comparing postchoice participants with post-no-choice participants (95% CI [0.80, 1.22]) and comparing postchoice with preselection participants (95% CI [0.88, 1.34]) yielded substantial support for a null effect. Gambling status supported substantial evidence for a null effect (95% CI [0.92, 1.30]), whereas higher PGSI (95% CI [1.08, 1.13]) and higher passive superstition scores (95% CI [1.08, 1.10]) overwhelmingly predicted our outcome.
CONCLUSIONS: Active choice elements in illusions of control may have been overemphasized in irrational gambling beliefs compared to passive superstitions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).