I want to believe: delusion, motivated reasoning, and Bayesian decision theory.

Introduction

Several arguments suggest that motivated reasoning (occurring when beliefs are not solely shaped by accuracy, but also by other motives such as promoting self-esteem or self-protection) is important in delusions. However, classical theories of delusion disregard the role of motivated reasoning. Thus, this role remains poorly understood.

Methods

To explore the role of motivated reasoning in delusions, here we propose a computational model of delusion based on a Bayesian decision framework. This proposes that beliefs are not only evaluated based on their accuracy (as in classical theories), but also based on the cost (in terms of reward and punishment) of rejecting them.

Results

The model proposes that, when the values at stake are high (as often it is the case in the context of delusion), a belief might be endorsed because rejecting it is evaluated as too costly, even if the belief is less accurate. This process might contribute to the genesis of delusions.

Conclusions

Our account offers an interpretation of how motivated reasoning might shape delusions. This can inspire research on the affective and motivational processes supporting delusions in clinical conditions such as in psychosis, neurological disorders, and delusional disorder.