A comparison of consensus and nonconsensus approaches to modeling contraceptive choice behavior.

This paper develops a more general model of contraceptive choice, taking into account a fundamental difference between the condom and the contraceptive pill, the two most commonly used reversible contraceptives in the US. The pill produces a single output of pregnancy prevention, but the condom is an input into a joint production for both pregnancy prevention and disease protection. Since the condom is ultimately used by the male, and the pill by the female, noncooperative game theory is used to model the separate male and female utility functions. Using both Stackelberg and Nash as solution concepts, econometric specifications are derived and the models are compared with the specifications derived from a consensus model of the household. Simultaneous-move Nash best describes the behavior of unmarried and noncohabiting sexual partners, and female-leader Stackelberg outperforms the other models for married or cohabiting couples.